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Abstract
We reassess the respective gains from R&D cooperation and competition in
a Cournot Duopoly with homogeneous goods, where firms adopt a concave
cost-reducing R&D technology. Contrary to the previous literature on the
same topic, our main results are that (i) no corner solutions emerge and (ii)
cooperation, in the form of either a cartel or a joint venture, is always prof-
itable for firms and (iii) socially superior to independent ventures, provided
that spillovers are suﬃciently high.
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1 Introduction
The National Research Cooperation Act (1984) fosters R&D cooperation as a
remedy to the well known eﬀort duplication drawback aﬀecting R&D races.1
The existence of substantial spillovers in the R&D activity, as evidenced in
Jaﬀe (1986), has added momentum to the justification of a benevolent stance
towards cooperation in research. Following Katz (1986), a large body of
literature has built the theoretical foundations and the policy legitimation to
such measures. The most relevant contributions concerning the desirability
of R&D cooperation are d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Kamien et
al. (1992), Suzumura (1992) and Amir (2000), to mention only a few. A
thorough assessment can be found in Katz and Ordover (1990).
d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) examine a Cournot duopoly, where
each firm enjoys a spillover from the rival in terms of the final outcome of
R&D activity, in the following sense. To firm i, investing ki costs bk2i (i.e.,
there are decreasing returns to R&D), but eﬀective R&D, reducing firm i’s
marginal cost ci, is Ki = ki + βkj, where β ∈ [0, 1] is the extent of the
externality from the rival. Therefore, given a generic initial marginal cost c,
we have ci = c−Ki. In Kamien et al. (1992), instead, the spillover eﬀect is
measured in value terms. They assume that each firm has a concave R&D
technology f (Yi) , where Yi = yi+βyj is the eﬀective R&D eﬀort, while firm
i’s marginal cost is ci = c−f (Yi) . This is coupled with linear R&D costs equal
to yi. Using f (Yi) =
p
yi + βyj, Amir (2000) shows that the two models are
isomorphic up to the transformation ki = yi/
√
b. For this reason, one may
restrict the focus simply upon d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). They
1A similar view has been also adopted in the EU (EC commission, 1990) and Japan
(see Goto and Wakasugi, 1988).
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compare two diﬀerent games. In the first, firms behave noncooperatively
in choosing both R&D eﬀorts and output levels. In the second, firms set
up a cartel in the R&D stage, tuning R&D investments so as to maximise
joint profits only in that stage, while remaining Nash rivals in the market
stage. From the comparison of the two setups, d’Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988) discover that, for large spillover levels [β > 1/2] , (i) R&D investments
- and cost reduction - are higher with cooperation, and conversely for small
spillovers; (ii) social welfare is superior again under cooperative behaviour,
and conversely. Unfortunately, a shortcoming emerges since profits turn out
to be larger with cartel than with noncooperation when spillovers are low
[β < 1/2] . We are then left with an unpleasant conflict between private and
social incentives towards R&D cooperation (or cartel). Jaﬀe (1986)
A further drawback appears since the model of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin
lacks an internal optimum over the whole admissible range of parameters.2
In this paper we address the same issue, i.e., the possible gains from
R&D cooperation as compared to competition. We design a concave R&D
technology with linear costs, such that (i) no corner solution emerges and
(ii) cooperation, in the form of either a cartel or a joint venture, is profitable
for firms irrespective of the level of spillovers and also (iii) socially beneficial
vis a` vis independent ventures, when technological spillovers are suﬃciently
large. This result shows up even though we keep unaltered the conditions
on demand and production costs embraced in the aforementioned literature.
Moreover, it appears to be in line with empirical research assessing the size
of technological spillovers (Jaﬀe, 1986).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The basic setup is
2On this point, see Henriques (1990), d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1990) and Amir
and Wooders (1998).
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laid out in section 2. Sections 3, 4 and 5 examine the cases of noncooperative
R&D, the R&D cartel and the joint venture, respectively. Private and social
incentives towards R&D cooperation are evaluated in section 6. Section 7
contains concluding remarks.
2 The model
Consider a Cournot duopoly with homogeneous products where the demand
function is
p = a− q1 − q2 (1)
and firm i operates with the following cost function
Ci = ciqi + rki (2)
where r is the rental price of capital and ki is the capital commitment de-
voted to process innovation. The linear cost associated with the R&D eﬀort
fits situations where firms must raise funds ki in order to finance research
activities, at the cost measured by the relevant interest rate on long-run in-
vestments determined on capital markets. I.e., rki is indeed the opportunity
cost of committing resources ki to R&D instead of investing them otherwise.
If each firm activates an independent research division, the R&D technology
is described by:
ci = c
µ
1− ki + βkj
1 + ki + βkj
¶
, (3)
where β ∈ [0, 1] measures the reciprocal technological spillover received from
the other firm.3 This R&D technology is concave and bounded above and
3Here, as in d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and the majority of the existing lit-
erature on these issues, the spillover level is exogenous and symmetric across firms. The
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below. In particular,
ci = c iﬀ ki = kj = 0 (4)
lim
ki→∞
ci = 0.
If firms jointly activate a single R&D lab, production technology will be the
same for both firms, i.e.: ci = cj = c. Undertaking an RJV involves i) the
sharing of R&D costs, i.e.: ki = k/2; ii) β = 1. Therefore, R&D technology
becomes:
c = c
µ
1− k
1 + k
¶
. (5)
Considered together, the cost function (2) and the R&D technology (3) or (5)
replace the linear technology and the convex R&D cost function previously
considered in d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). It is also worth noting
that the present setup cannot be transformed into theirs, as it was instead
the case with the approach adopted by Kamien et al. (1992). This is due to
the fact that here (either in (3) or in (5)) c goes to zero only in the limit, as
the industry R&D eﬀort becomes infinitely large.
Regardless of the organization of the research activity, in the market stage
firms always adopt a Cournot stance. Accordingly, individual equilibrium
output is:
q∗i =
a− 2ci + cj
3
, (6)
so that the profit function of firm i at the first stage of the game is:
πi =
(a− 2ci + cj)2
9
− rki. (7)
endogenisation of spillovers is investigated in Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) and Amir and
Wooders (2003).
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3 Noncooperative R&D
Here, we assume that firms behave noncooperatively in the first stage. The
first order condition (FOC), for firm i, is:
∂πi
∂ki
=
2c
9
·
a− c(1 + ki (2β − 1) + kj (2− β))
(1 + ki + βkj) (1 + kj + βki)
¸
·
·
"
2 (1 + kj + βki)2 − β (1 + ki + βkj)2
(1 + ki + βkj)2 (1 + kj + βki)2
#
− r = 0 (8)
which, imposing the symmetry condition kj = ki, becomes4:
∂πi
∂ki
=
2c(2− β) [a (1 + ki(1 + β))− 1]− 9r (1 + ki(1 + β))3
9 (1 + ki(1 + β))3
= 0. (9)
The Nash equilibrium R&D eﬀort is:
kN = 6 a r c (2− β) (1 + β)
4 − 9r (1 + β)2 3
√
3Φ+ 3
√
9Φ2
9r (1 + β)3 3
√
3Φ
(10)
where
Φ = (2− β) (1 + β)6
·q
3c3r3 [243cr − 8a3 (2− β)]− 27c2r2
¸
. (11)
Non negativity and reality conditions require that:
r ≥ 8a
3 (2− β)
243c = r
N . (12)
We are then able to state the following:
Proposition 1 For all r ≥ rN we have a unique interior equilibrium for the
R&D stage where ki = kN for i = 1, 2.
4The equation has 3 roots, out of which only one is real.
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Proof. See Appendix.
By iterating the Hoˆspital rule we get:
lim
r→∞
kN = 0. (13)
Moreover, kN is always decreasing in r.
Using kN , one can obtain industry profits and social welfare at the Nash
equilibrium. Consumer surplus is defined as:
CSN =
¡
a− pN
¢ ¡
qN1 + qN2
¢
2
. (14)
Therefore, welfare is SWN = CSN +
P
πNi .5
4 R&D cartel
When firms build up a cartel in the R&D stage, they choose R&D eﬀorts so
as to maximize joint profits. Accordingly, their objective, in the first stage,
becomes:
max
ki,kj
ΠC =
X
πi =
X"(a− 2ci + cj)2
9
− rki
#
. (15)
The distinctive feature of cartel behaviour consists in internalising the spillover
eﬀect. This can be seen by writing the FOC as follows:
∂ΠC
∂ki
=
∂πi
∂ki
+
∂πj
∂ki
= 0. (16)
The solution is6:
kC = 6 a r c (1 + β)
5 − 9r (1 + β)2 3
√
3Ψ+ 3
√
9Ψ2
9r (1 + β)3 3
√
3Ψ
(17)
5Throughout the paper, the expression of consumer surplus and social welfare are
omitted for brevity. They are availble upon request.
6As in the fully noncooperative case the FOC yields 3 solutions, out of which only one
is acceptable.
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where
Ψ = r c (1 + β)7
hp
3cr [243cr − 8a3 (1 + β)]− 27cr
i
. (18)
Non negativity and reality conditions require that:
r ≥ 8a
3 (1 + β)
243c = r
C . (19)
It can be verified that rN ≥ rC for β ∈ [0, 1/2] and conversely in the remain-
der of the admissible interval of the spillover parameter.
Therefore:
Proposition 2 For all r ≥ rC we have a unique interior equilibrium for the
R&D stage where ki = kC for i = 1, 2.
Proof. The proof is omitted as it replicates the same procedure seen in
Proposition 1.
As in the fully noncooperative setting, the optimal R&D eﬀort is every-
where decreasing in r, shrinking to zero in the limit when the cost of capital
becomes infinitely high. Using the equilibrium controls we can get the opti-
mal profits and social welfare as in the previous section.
5 RJV
Alternatively, firms may undertake joint R&D (RJV). As a result R&D is
carried out in a single lab jointly funded by both firms symmetrically sharing
the cost. Accordingly, the objective of the single firm is:
max
k
π = (a− c)
2
9
− rk
2
(20)
s.t. : c = c
µ
1− k
1 + k
¶
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Owing to the RJV, we impose (i) symmetry on marginal costs and R&D
eﬀorts across firms, and (ii), full spillovers, i.e., β = 1. Then the FOC is:
∂π
∂k =
4c [a (1 + k)− c]− 9r (1 + k)3
18 (1 + k)3
= 0. (21)
The only admissible solution is:
kRJV = 2 a r c
3
√
36− 9r 3
√
Ω+ 3
√
6Ω2
9r 3
√
Ω
(22)
where
Ω = r c
hp
3cr [243cr − 16a3]− 27cr
i
. (23)
Reality and non negativity conditions require that
r ≥ 16a
3
243c = r
RJV . (24)
This is the most restrictive condition met so far.
Therefore:
Proposition 3 For all r ≥ rRJV we have a unique interior equilibrium for
the R&D stage where k = kRJV .
Proof. The proof is omitted as it parallels that of Proposition 1.
As in the previous cases, the optimal R&D eﬀort is everywhere decreasing
in r, shrinking to zero in the limit when the cost of capital becomes infinitely
high. Equilibrium values of sales and R&D investments can be used to obtain
the optimal profits and social welfare.
6 Private and social incentive to R&D coop-
eration
Thanks to the equilibrium expressions of kN , kC and kRJV , we can deliver
the corresponding profits, consumer surplus and social welfare in the three
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alternative settings. It turns out that, irrespective of the values of param-
eters {a, c, r} , private and social preferences concerning the organizational
design of R&D activity depend, in general, upon the level of the technolog-
ical spillover β. The qualitative aspects of such preferences, concerning the
individual firm’s profits, consumer surplus and social welfare, are displayed
in figures 1-3.
Consider figure 1. The diﬀerence πC−πN (figure 1a) is positive for all ad-
missible values of β, except β = 1/2 where noncooperative profits equal cartel
profits. This is due to the fact that in correspondence of β = 1/2 the bene-
ficial externality that a firm receives from the rival at the Nash equilibrium
of the noncooperative R&D stage is exactly equivalent to internalising the
same externality in a cartel. Figure 1b portrays πRJV − πN , which is always
positive as firms share the cost of a single R&D lab, but intuitively decreasing
in β since increasing the spillover makes joint investment, although always
convenient, progressively less so as compared to independent ventures. Fig-
ure 1c draws πRJV − πC ; here, the previous argument goes through largely
unchanged, although of course πRJV = πC in β = 1, since full spillovers make
firms just indiﬀerent between cost sharing and joint profit maximisation.
Now examine figure 2. From figure 2a, observe that CSC > CSN for all
β ∈ (1/2, 1] , and conversely in the remainder of the parameter interval. This
is a consequence of the balance between the beneficial eﬀects of internalising
spillovers by means of R&D cartelisation, and the damage that joint profit
maximisation at the first stage necessarily entails. As for figures 2b and 2c,
here we have that CSRJV > CSN and CSRJV > CSC always, with cartel
and joint venture performing equally well at β = 1.
Figure 3 summarises all of the above eﬀects in terms of social welfare.
In particular, SWC > SWN for all β ∈ (1/2, 1] as a consequence of the
9
behaviour of consumer surplus in the same parameter subset. Again, under
full spillovers, the performance of an R&D cartel exactly replicates that of
an RJV.
Figure 1a
6
-0
πC − πN
β11/2
Figure 1b
6
-0
πRJV − πN
β1
Figure 1c
6
-
πRJV − πC
β0 1
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Figure 2a
6
-0
CSC − CSN
β11/2
Figure 2b
6
-0
CSRJV − CSN
β1
Figure 2c
6
-
CSRJV − CSC
β0 1
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Figure 3a
6
-0
SWC − SWN
β11/2
Figure 3b
6
-0
SWRJV − SWN
β1
Figure 3c
6
-
SWRJV − SWC
β0 1
From the comparison of the three scenarios investigated above, we can
draw the following conclusions:
Proposition 4 (Private incentives) πRJV > πC > πN for all admissible
spillover levels.
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More precisely: the higher is the intensity of cooperation in the R&D
stage, the higher are the profits accruing to firms in equilibrium. Note that
the turning point β = 1/2, around which the incentives to cooperate or com-
pete used to flip over in the previous approach (d’Aspremont and Jacquemin,
1988) has now disappeared. The above proposition is intuitive if one recog-
nizes that firms evaluate the option to activate some form of R&D coop-
eration against the alternative of undertaking independent ventures, all else
equal. In the market stage firms compete a` la Cournot-Nash, no matter what
they have previously chosen as to the design of R&D activity. That is, an
R&D cartel must always be preferred to Nash behaviour, because firms max-
imise joint profits at the first stage. This holds, a fortiori, if they establish a
research joint venture, reaping further cost savings.
Proposition 5 (Social incentives) SWRJV > SWN > SWC for all β ∈
[0, 1/2) ; SWRJV > SWC > SWN for all β ∈ (1/2, 1] .
The above Proposition says that, in general, the RJV with β = 1 welfare-
dominates the alternative R&D arrangements. As in the linear technology
case investigated by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), R&D cooperation
in the form of a cartel is socially eﬃcient if and only if spillovers are large
enough, and conversely. If β is large, cooperation internalises the benefits
generated by R&D eﬀorts largely enough to justify R&D cartelisation from
the social standpoint. Leaving aside RJVs, this discussion leads to the fol-
lowing Corollary:
Corollary 1 For all β ∈ (1/2, 1] , both private and social incentives point to
the adoption of a cartel in the R&D stage, if the alternative is competition.
The above corollary is the main result drawn from the foregoing analysis.
It states that if technological externalities are large enough, then R&D co-
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operation is both profitable and socially eﬃcient, in sharp contrast with the
previous literature on the same topic.
Finally, taking into account the possibility of setting up RJVs, Proposi-
tions 4-5 also entail the following:
Corollary 2 RJV is profit - and welfare - superior as compared to both com-
petitive and cartel R&D, irrespective of the level of spillovers.
Intuitively, the private and social desirability of a research joint venture
vis a` vis any alternative organisational design of R&D activities stems from
the saving eﬀect implicit in activating a single research lab, whose costs are
shared by firms. This enhances profits as well as social welfare.
7 Concluding remarks
We have revisited the issue of cooperative R&D investments in a Cournot
duopoly where the R&D technology is characterised by spillovers and it is
immune from corner solutions at the R&D stage of the game. In our fresh
framework the conflict between private and social incentives towards R&D
cooperation, highlighted in previous contributions, may disappear.7 In par-
ticular, R&D cartelisation is privately and socially preferable to R&D com-
petition if spillovers are large enough, which is the most common case, as
empirical research on this issue confirms (see, e.g., Jaﬀe, 1986). RJV re-
mains the best alternative from both standpoints irrespective of the level of
technological externalities.
7The analysis of a dynamic game where smoothing the R&D investment plan over an
arbitrarily long time horizon has similar consequences is in Cellini and Lambertini (2003).
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Appendix
Here we go through the SOCs to prove Proposition 1. Under the symmetry
condition kj = ki, local optimality is assured by:
∂2πi
∂k2i
= −
2c
£
c (β(4 + β)− 8) + 2a (ki(1 + β) + 1)
¡
2− β2
¢¤
9 [ki(1 + β) + 1]4
≤ 0, (a1)
while global optimality requires the Hessian matrix to be semi-definite neg-
ative, i.e.:
∆H =
µ
∂2πi
∂k2i
¶2
−
µ
∂2πi
∂ki∂kj
¶2
≥ 0, (a2)
where
∆H =
4c2 (2− β)
¡
1− β2
¢
[2a (ki(1 + β) + 1)− 3c]Γ
81 [ki(1 + β) + 1]8
(a3)
Γ ≡ 2a (2 + β) (ki(1 + β) + 1)− c (10− β) .
Using ki = kN we can verify numerically that conditions (a1) and (a2) are
met for all β ∈ [0, 1].
Unlike previous research on the same topic, the present model features
no kinks in the SOCs. One may prove this by normalising a − c = 1 and
plotting the SOCs over r, β ∈ [0, 1]. This is the outcome of the functional form
adopted to describe the R&D technology that belongs to the unit interval.
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